Regulatory Capture Dynamics – the Israeli Case Study

Cite As:
Rolnik Guy, Shapira Roy. Regulatory Capture Dynamics – the Israeli Case Study Haifa Israel: Samuel Neaman Institute, 2019. https://www.neaman.org.il/EN/Regulatory-Capture-Dynamics-the-Israeli-Case-Study
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How does one achieve effective regulation? Under which conditions does economic regulation achieve its goals and promote the public good? Under which conditions economic regulation deviates from its goals and promotes narrow interests at the expense of the public interest?

Public opinion polls in Israel and around the world show that the public is suspicious of regulation. The public believes that regulation does not work effectively in its favor but promotes narrow interests. Many academic studies back up citizens' intuitive concerns, and show that too often "Regulatory Capture" occurs: Regulated bodies manage to pull regulation in their favor, increasing regulatory burden (to block new competitors) or reducing it (to save themselves costs at will).

What causes this regulatory capture and how can one be released from captivity and increase effectiveness?

These are the questions that this Research deals with.

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