During 2025, a new wave of the “Arab–Jewish Relations Index in Israel” survey was conducted amid major regional and domestic events, including the war in Gaza, the war against Iran, and widespread protests calling for the return of hostages held by Hamas. As in previous cycles, the study surveyed both Arab and Jewish populations. The Arab sample included 720 adults from 28 Arab and mixed localities, randomly selected from the Population Registry and interviewed face-to-face in Arabic (May–June; resumed and completed July–August). The Jewish sample comprised 1,507 adults in a nationwide, stratified design ensuring representation of key sub-populations (e.g., Haredim, West Bank settlers, Russian-speaking immigrants, kibbutz/moshav members), who completed an online questionnaire in Hebrew or Russian. Statistical weights were applied.
Findings portray a complex and at times highly troubling picture of intergroup relations and Arab minority–state relations. Across multiple dimensions, a substantial division persists, accompanied by mutual negative perceptions, low trust in one another and in institutions, and increasing rigidity in attitudes. Arab respondents reported mixed tendencies toward integration: willingness varies by domain, and while interest in friendships with Jews exists, support for creating shared values has declined. Jewish respondents showed a clearer preference for separation, with reduced willingness to adopt Arab customs and fewer reported friendships.
Both groups increasingly attributed violence-proneness and hate dissemination to the other side’s media and leadership. Arab respondents reported high alienation from the state, strong perceptions of discrimination, and heightened insecurity, alongside concerns about threats such as rights violations and land expropriation. Jewish respondents expressed discomfort with Arab presence, high perceptions of disloyalty, and support for preferential policies toward Jews. Sharp gaps emerged on conflict-resolution preferences (e.g., two-state solution), with limited convergence mainly on Iran. Advanced analyses indicate that positive intergroup contact is associated with higher coexistence, while religiosity, negative encounters, discrimination experiences (among Arabs), and right-wing orientation (among Jews) correlate with greater militancy or rejection.
The report concludes with policy recommendations emphasizing equality legislation and enforcement, organizational inclusion, and educational initiatives – including mixed schooling and curricula that deepen mutual familiarity.
